



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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## Japanese Textile Quotas and U.S.

by Warren S. Hunsberger

Japanese quotas on cotton goods shipments to the United States, in effect since January 1956, are to be broadened and continued "for some years." This announcement was made in late September by the Japanese Embassy in Washington. Thus, without formal action by the United States government, the American cotton textile industry has succeeded in its campaign for quantitative limitations on competitive imports.

The new quotas are similar in some ways to the prewar limitation adopted in 1937 by Japanese cotton manufacturers in an agreement with their American competitors. Both agreements, for example, came into being after a period of dramatic increases in Japanese exports of cotton goods to the American market. Both were accepted by the Japanese industry in expectation of avoiding or easing tariffs or other formal barriers in the United States.

In certain respects, however, there are important differences. Present limitations are imposed by the Japanese government through the means of export licenses, unlike the prewar agreement between the manufacturers in the two countries. That arrangement was deemed to conflict with our antitrust laws and

consequently never officially went into effect, although the Japanese lived up to the terms. Present limitations were imposed after diplomatic talks and have official blessing in the United States, including President Eisenhower's statement that they are "constructive and helpful."

Two categories of cotton manufactures are involved, cloth and wearing apparel. Compared with production in the United States, the volume of cotton cloth imports from Japan and all other sources amounted to about 1.5 percent in 1955. Imports are also much smaller than United States exports. In terms of value, total imports of all cotton manufactures from Japan came to \$60 million in 1955, or 0.4 percent of the \$13.4 billion in reported sales for the United States industry.

These quotas have served to allay a good part of the industry protest in this country. One appeal for higher tariffs under the "escape clause" of the Trade Agreements Act was dropped when the present blouse quota was announced in June. But the difficulties of cotton manufacturing in the United States are not wholly the result of Japanese competition. The challenge of man-made fibers is having

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a severe impact, and the industry is still in the process of migrating from New England to the South.

The Japanese interests concerned have not yet been satisfied. The present quotas were adopted in September, according to the Japanese, "on the condition that all feasible steps will be taken by the United States government to solve the problem of discriminatory state textile legislation and to prevent further restrictive action with regard to the importation of Japanese textiles into the United States." Although no further state restrictions have been imposed since last winter, when South Carolina and Alabama enacted laws requiring stores selling Japanese textiles to carry prominent signs to that effect, these laws remain in force. And further United States federal restrictions are not unlikely. The Tariff Commission recommended on October 24 that United States import duties on velveteens be increased sharply.

### Japan's Trade Needs

Japan's 90 million people depend on foreign trade to supplement the limited food and raw material supplies that can be coaxed from four rocky and crowded islands. Japan must trade in all possible markets, including the world's largest market, the United States. Japan's exports are being diversified and now include supertankers and other ships, precision instruments, handicrafts and a tremendous array of other products. But cotton textiles are still important to Japan, accounting for 11 percent of total export value in 1955.

Among Japan's markets other than the United States, China and other continental areas with Communist regimes offer limited quantities of materials needed in Japan, but in return seek to buy products prohibited by strategic trade controls. Korea and Taiwan offer far less of a market than in times when they were Japanese colonies. South and Southeast Asia offer promising markets, but Japan's exports to this area are recovering only slowly from World War II for a variety of reasons. Much larger shares of Japanese exports than in prewar days are going to Europe, Africa, Latin America, Canada and the Middle East. These areas together took more than a third of Japan's exports in the prosperous year of 1955.

### U.S. Market Essential

But the United States market is still essential. Japan buys much more than it sells here and is making vigorous efforts to bring this trade more nearly into balance. Japan, it is said, has "a latent dollar shortage" that is currently hidden by large United States government and troop expenditures within its borders. Under these circumstances, Washington's encouragement of quota limitations on Japan's textile exports raises some serious questions.

How does such encouragement fit into the United States role as leader of efforts toward freer and larger world trade? What should Japan do to expand its \$22 billion economy when America's \$400 billion economy insists on protecting competitive

industries? If Japan's answer should be to increase its trade with Communist areas, what then should be Washington's attitude? If textiles, which are among the first articles produced by factory industry in most developing economies and are less strategic than many other products, are not to find a market in the United States, what are the realistic opportunities for countries less developed than Japan to earn needed dollars for development?

And what are the long-run implications for the American economy of providing—without the public hearings and other "due process" of Tariff Commission procedures—rigid quota protection for small and presumably weak segments of an industry whose wage and profit rates are professedly below the average of other manufacturing industries? In sum, the question is, Do such quotas further the interests of the American people as a whole?

Amidst the satisfaction about Japan's quotas expressed by President Eisenhower and other American officials, as well as by industry spokesmen, such questions as these have not been mentioned. Unless one is to accept the thesis that what is good for certain segments of the cotton textile industry is necessarily good for the country, these questions require attention.

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## Needed: Clear Middle East Policy

Events in the Middle East have exposed the bankruptcy of American Middle East policy. Fortunately the election is over, and a real effort can now be made to plan ahead with our allies and the United Nations for a fair, lasting and practical settlement in this major crisis spot of the world.

Through two administrations — Democratic and Republican — the government has played politics with the Middle East. It has vacillated, promised, cajoled and threatened—but never planned. It organized the Baghdad pact to contain the U.S.S.R. at a time when it denounced “containment” as inadequate—and wound up declining to join it. It put pressure on Britain to evacuate its Suez Canal bases—but felt no responsibility for keeping President Gamal Abdel Nasser from trying to push the British out of the Middle East. It hesitated to give arms to Egypt so long that Cairo finally turned to Moscow—and then acted outraged and hurt at Nasser’s decision. It offered to help Nasser build a dam across the Nile that would eclipse any previous river project in history—and then abruptly and publicly withdrew its offer.

Washington’s faults have been those of omission as well as commission. It watched the collapse of Western influence in Egypt without a single study by the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department as to what it would do if Nasser seized Suez. It had nothing to propose as a substitute for force to make Nasser respect international obligations.

It was then that the British and French, thoroughly fed up with America’s platitudes, promises and election preoccupation, decided to

move on their own to protect their vital interests. But even when it was obvious to everyone in Tel Aviv, Paris and London that something was simmering, Washington continued to talk “good news” from the Middle East. And, when finally the awful blow fell, when it was clear that London and Paris had deliberately ignored the United States in their Egyptian war plans, Vice President Richard M. Nixon on November 2 cheered this development as American “independence” from domination by our allies.

### Confusion on Issues

But worse was to come. Washington hastened to affirm its adherence to the tripartite declaration of 1950 that promised aid to the party attacked, but simultaneously said no American forces would be involved; and it never did get around to helping Nasser at all. It demanded that the UN label our allies, Britain and France, aggressors—unmindful that Nasser was a law-breaker himself, having closed the canal to Israeli ships since 1948. It denounced Israel, Britain and France for waging preventive war, but ignored Egypt’s acts that brought on the war.

The result was that Mr. Dulles found himself siding in the UN with the U.S.S.R. and Nasser. And, finally, almost as if to prove how contradictory and confusing our Middle East position could be, the United States proudly hailed British and French acceptance of a cease-fire—ignoring the fact that they accepted only after their aggression had paid off. Somewhere between the beginning and the end of the fighting the United States forgot its earlier view

that Britain and France were aggressors.

But crying over spilt Middle East milk does not contribute to solutions for the future. What this experience should teach us is that, just as President Eisenhower said so eloquently on October 31, “we cannot have one standard of morality for our friends and one for our enemies,” so we also cannot have a clear policy in one part of the world and an unclear policy in another—and expect peace. In the Far East we have explicitly told our enemies or potential foes just what the score is and where the perimeter of American interest lies. And we have done the same in Western Europe, in South America and in the Antipodes. But we have not done this explicitly and specifically in the Middle East.

There are signs that the White House is at long last getting around to this critical issue in our foreign policy. The UN plan for a Middle East police force based on contributions by small nations is a foundation on which to build. The Kremlin is penetrating the Middle East more deeply with every passing month, and now it talks of sending “volunteers” to Egypt—which brings up dread memories of Korea.

If the Administration waits for the Middle East to settle, as the Truman Administration waited for the dust to settle in China, before deciding what to do, we might see the U.S.S.R. firmly established in all this rich and strategic area. And the loss of China to communism would seem small by comparison to the loss of the whole Middle East to Soviet control.

NEAL STANFORD



## How Should U.S. Compete With Russia?

The most crucial decision the new Eisenhower Administration will face in 1957—a decision that will affect all other aspects of foreign policy—concerns the terms on which this country will compete, or contend, with Russia in the wake of the shattering events in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

Was the post-Stalin "thaw" which encouraged President Eisenhower to meet the Soviet leaders at the Geneva "summit" conference in 1955 merely a delusion and a snare? Must the Administration, after having stressed the prospects for peace during the election campaign, now grimly prepare the nation for prospects of war—and this time not just a "cold" war but a military confrontation unpredictable in proportions and consequences?

### End of Stalemate

The one firm fact amid a welter of speculation about the future is that the global stalemate, which, many assumed, had been brought about by universal realization that nuclear war would spell the destruction of all ideologies and civilizations, has been broken. It has been broken in the Middle East by Israel's invasion of Egypt and the Anglo-French military seizure of Suez. It has been broken in Eastern Europe by liberalization of Poland's Communist regime under anti-Stalinist Premier Wladyslaw Gomulka and by the anti-Communist as well as anti-Russian uprising in Hungary, ruthlessly crushed by Russian armed force. Whatever the short-term developments in both areas—and both for centuries have been battlegrounds for contending great powers—the

long-term outlook is that restoration of the *status quo* will prove impossible. New initiatives must be taken; new adjustments will have to be made.

The most significant aspect of the two tragedies—in Egypt and Hungary—is the loss of prestige suffered by the great powers involved. Western observers do not regard the two tragedies as comparable. They point out that while Russia has undertaken to crush an entire helpless nation permanently, Britain and France sought only to impose a limited settlement of the Suez problem on a government which had taken hostile actions against them. This is a convincing argument, yet the two actions have three factors in common.

First, Britain and France took the risk of war on the ground that their vital economic and security interests were at stake—and President Eisenhower, while rebuking our allies, recognized in his address to the nation on October 31 their "manifest right" to take the decision they did. From Moscow's point of view, even if this may seem unwarranted in the West, the attempt of Hungarian anti-Communists to remove their country from the Eastern defense bloc represented a threat to the security of the U.S.S.R., a breach in the wall it had been building since 1945 against a future German invasion, which might be backed by the United States. The concept of "manifest right" is a two-edged sword which our enemies, as well as our friends, can claim the paramount necessity to wield.

Second, Britain and France had as one of their objectives the overthrow of President Gamal Abdel Nasser

and, presumably, his replacement by a leader more favorable or more adaptable to their interests. Russia, by methods of unvarnished brutality, which promptly alienated not only Western nations but the uncommitted countries of Asia as well as many Western Communists, overthrew Hungarian leaders inimical to Moscow and replaced them with a regime acquiescent to its aims. Throughout history great powers have felt justified in disposing of rulers in neighboring lands whom they regarded as dangerous to their interests. The West's case against Russia's action in Hungary would have been far stronger if Britain and France, not only in the dim past but in the living present, had not acted likewise—as Germany had also done on the eve of World War II with its Quislings and Japan with puppet Manchukuo. For either there are standards of international morality for all states, or else they are applicable to none.

And, third, Britain and France on the one hand, and Russia on the other, started out by flouting the United States, which found itself in the novel role of mediator between clashing contestants in the United Nations forum rather than in its formerly clear-cut role of ally of one group and challenger of the other. But the United States itself did not emerge unscathed from these grueling events. For, while it had given moral encouragement to the peoples of Eastern Europe in the struggle for "liberation," when the test came it offered no military aid to the embattled Hungarians in spite of their pitiful last-minute appeals. And while it initially chided Israel as the

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## France's Algerian Dilemma

by Benjamin Rivlin

Dr. Rivlin, of the Department of Political Science at Brooklyn College, has just made a trip to Morocco and is now conducting research on North African affairs in France.

PARIS, November 15—The dramatic capture of five important leaders of the Algerian rebel Front for National Liberation (FLN) on October 22 as they were flying from Morocco to Tunisia to confer with Morocco's Sultan Mohammed V and Tunisia's Premier Habib Bourguiba has complicated rather than eased France's problems in North Africa. While the arrest undoubtedly has given French public opinion a psychological lift, strengthened the hands of advocates of a hard policy toward North African nationalism and shaken the rebel organization, strife continues in Algeria. Whereas a few weeks ago Paris was filled with rumors that some form of settlement of the Algerian question was in prospect, this seems unlikely now as the rebellion enters into its third year.

Meanwhile, relations between France and its former protectorates, Morocco and Tunisia, now independent, have been severely strained if not irreparably damaged by the manner in which the Algerian rebel chiefs were apprehended. The five leaders, as guests of the sovereign Sultan of Morocco, were flying in a chartered Moroccan plane manned by a French crew far over the Mediterranean in order to avoid Algerian territory, when the crew obeyed radio orders of French military authorities to bring the plane down in Algiers rather than Tunis.

Until the arrest of the FLN leaders the fighting in Algeria, or the "pacification campaign" as the French call it, had proved indecisive from the French point of view. De-

spite the commitment of more than 400,000 troops and the use of the latest technical equipment against guerrilla warfare, the Algerian rebels seemed to be holding their own and were no closer to surrender than when the fighting started on November 1, 1954. Whether the arrest of the five rebel chiefs will alter this situation materially remains to be seen. Other FLN leaders have vowed to continue the struggle, and reports of fighting continue to come in from Algeria.

The French government sought to capitalize on its arrest of the Algerian leaders in order to bring about political changes in Algeria before the opening of the 11th session of the United Nations General Assembly. On October 31 Premier Guy Mollet and his resident-minister in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, appealed to the Algerian people for a "cease-fire," declaring they would protect those who accepted the offer. At the same time they promised to introduce a policy of complete equality for all citizens residing in Algeria; to organize free elections; to open free discussions with representatives of the Algerian people in preparation of a new "fundamental law" which would express the "Algerian personality"; and to launch a large-scale economic program designed to raise the standard of living and to overcome the economic difficulties that have saddled Algeria for many years. So far no Algerian takers of the Mollet offer have come forward. The FLN has steadfastly insisted that the French government recognize "inde-

pendence" as the legitimate expression of the "Algerian personality," while the Mollet government has just as steadfastly refused to entertain this notion.

### Algeria's Special Position

The position of the French government has been that Algeria is an integral part of France, that it must remain so and that France will brook no foreign intervention in the settlement of the problem, which it views as a matter of French domestic jurisdiction. During the past year it appeared on several occasions that the French government, having settled with the nationalists in neighboring Morocco and Tunisia, was about to make concessions in Algeria to restore peace.

Algeria, however, is in a different situation from Morocco and Tunisia, which had been protectorates and as such had maintained their sovereignty. Not only is Algeria juridically, even if not effectively, an integral part of France, but it also has the largest and most deeply rooted French population of the three North African territories. And while Morocco had been under French rule for 40 years and Tunisia for 75 years, the French have been in Algeria for over 125 years. Consequently, the French, although they granted independence to Morocco and Tunisia, have thus far ruled out independence as a goal for Algeria. At most, they envisage for it some sort of federative status within the French Union.

The first occasion on which a change in the basic French attitude

toward Algeria seemed imminent was in the autumn of 1955 after the troublesome Moroccan situation had been resolved. The then premier, Edgar Faure, indicated that a new basis was necessary for Algeria's relationship with France. It was at this time that a new federative status was discussed. However, when the Algerian question was put on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, French opinion hardened, and the Faure government was unwilling to take any step in this direction for fear that this would give the impression that it was yielding to outside pressure. After the UN dropped the Algerian question from its agenda without debating it, there was no opportunity to act, as France had by that time become involved in the bitter election campaign of December 1955.

### **Mollet's Original Program**

The second occasion on which a conciliatory policy seemed imminent came early in 1956 after the election, when Socialist Guy Mollet took office as premier, with former Premier Pierre Mendès-France as minister of state without portfolio. Both men had campaigned on a platform of reform in Algeria. Mollet told the National Assembly of his determination to settle the Algerian question by consultations with the people of the country on a basis of total equality for French and Muslims alike and in such a manner that no one group would impose its will on the other.

As the first step, Mollet envisaged an electoral reform. The two-college electoral system under which some 1 million Frenchmen voting in the first college carried equal weight with the 8 million Muslims voting in the second college was to be replaced by a single college in which voting would be on an equal basis. Elections were to be held to determine the representatives with whom

the French government would consult about the new status of Algeria. Meanwhile, certain preliminary reforms in municipal organization and public administration were to be instituted; political prisoners were to be liberated and a series of indispensable social and economic measures, including agrarian reform, was to be undertaken.

To carry out this program Mollet appointed the 79-year-old General Georges Catroux, a man of great experience and liberal tendencies in Franco-Muslim relations, to the new post of resident-minister in Algeria. To pave the way for Catroux Mollet decided to go himself to Algeria. His plan of action for settling the Algerian question, however, never got off the ground. In Algeria, most of the French population viewed the creation of a single-college system, the appointment of Catroux and the other concessions to the Muslim population as a policy of "abandonment." When Mollet arrived he was greeted by angry French mobs and wildly hostile demonstrations.

The greeting accorded Mollet was partly engineered by rabble-rousing followers of Pierre Poujade, who came from France for the occasion, but it undoubtedly reflected the genuine feelings of the majority of the French settlers in Algeria. From their point of view the demonstrations brought the desired effect. General Catroux, upon learning of the demonstrations, immediately submitted his resignation without setting foot in Algeria, and Mollet, shaken by the experience, tried to reassure the French population of Algeria by declaring that "France will never leave Algeria; the ties between the metropolitan country and Algeria are indissoluble." Although Mollet continued to promise the Muslims "justice," from that moment his original plan went into the discard

even though he did not actually abandon it until several weeks later.

Mollet's position was too moderate, too conciliatory, too reasonable, for either of the extreme groups to accept. The French settlers expressed their contempt for the program in their hostile demonstrations, while the rebels continued to fight and to demand complete independence. The unfortunate result was that the breach between the two widened as tempers flared and emotionalism held sway. Muslim moderates, particularly, lost face in the eyes of their people because of the successful maneuvering of the settlers in blocking a program of conciliation.

### **Policy of 'Pacification'**

Mollet's next step was to issue a warning on February 28, 1956 urging the Muslim rebels to accept a cease-fire, accompanied by a pledge to hold free elections three months thereafter. This warning went unheeded by the rebels. To accept Mollet's conditions the rebels would have had to give up their positions of strength prior to the negotiations as well as to abandon their demand for complete independence. The Front for National Liberation was prepared to give up neither.

When the cease-fire was not accepted, the Mollet government embarked on a policy of "pacification," committing more and more troops to Algeria even to the extent of withdrawing large French forces from NATO, so that at this point there is one French soldier for every 20 Muslims in Algeria. The new Algerian policy was now, first, pacification, then elections and finally the drafting of the new statute for Algeria by the elected representatives of the entire Algerian population. This change in policy, particularly the stepping-up of military action against the rebels, brought a clash between

Mendès-France and Mollet and the resignation of the former from the cabinet. Mendès contended that force alone could not settle the Algerian question and that there was an "insurmountable contradiction" between the new Algerian policy and the liberal policy which had granted independence to Tunisia and Morocco. At the outset, the pacification phase of the new policy was envisaged as taking six months, to be concluded in early summer. When the deadline passed, it was extended to "the fall." In November it is still going on. The government is now hoping that its new policy stated on October 31 will bring about a break in the impasse.

### France Against Negotiations

One of the greatest stumbling blocks to the resolution of the Algerian crisis has been the unwillingness of the French authorities to recognize the Front for National Liberation as a "valid interlocutor"—that is, a genuine spokesman for the Algerian people. Last spring French opinion was shocked when Ferhat Abbas, a long-standing moderate nationalist leader, defected to the Front for National Liberation. On September 25 a nonnationalist Algerian Muslim with a long record of friendship toward France, Abderrahman Fares, former president of the Algerian Assembly, declared "the valid interlocutor now is the Front for National Liberation—it is necessary to start discussions before it is too late." As a matter of fact, it has just been revealed that unofficial conversations had taken place on five occasions in the past half year between Pierre Commin, acting secretary-general of the Socialist party, to which Premier Mollet belongs, and leaders of the FLN. Now, with the arrest of the five FLN leaders, discussions seem impossible for the time being. Will

the French be able to find other Algerians with whom to negotiate? It is difficult to see where these other Algerian spokesmen will come from.

The possibility of mediating the Algerian war was raised recently by both the Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed ben Youssef, and Premier Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia. Both these leaders are seriously disturbed by the Algerian struggle. As neighboring Muslim countries which only recently gained their freedom, not without some significant and timely help from the Algerian rebels, Morocco and Tunisia are sympathetic with the cause of Algerian nationalism. Moreover, the fact that French troops are using both Morocco and Tunisia as bases for operations against the Algerian rebels has greatly strained relations between France and its former protectorates. Because of the Algerian situation, the vital negotiations between France and the two North African countries on such matters as French economic and cultural interests, the protection of French citizens and French military bases are at a standstill. The longer the Algerian war continues, the more difficult it will be to regularize these relationships, and it is for this reason that Bourguiba and the Sultan are anxious to help settle the Algerian issue. This was the purpose of the Tunis conference at which they were to meet the five Algerian

leaders who were arrested by France.

These recent developments in North Africa as well as the outbreak of hostilities in Egypt seem to have ruled out mediation in the Algerian affair. France's position has hardened considerably not only because of the capture of the rebel leaders but also because of the developments in the Middle East, which the Mollet government has long considered as inexorably linked to the Algerian question. Part of France's objective in the Suez crisis last summer and now is to aid the French cause in Algeria by deflating President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, whom it accuses of furnishing arms to the Algerian rebels.

### UN and Algeria

Unless some last-minute efforts to halt the fighting in Algeria prove successful, France faces the very embarrassing possibility that the issue may be placed on the agenda of the 11th session of the UN General Assembly. In 1955 the Assembly placed the Algerian question on its agenda by the narrow margin of 28 to 27. This prompted France to walk out, to boycott the Assembly meetings and to charge that the UN had violated France's domestic jurisdiction. After nearly two months of behind-the-scenes negotiations, France returned to the Assembly when that body decided "not to consider fur-

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ther" the Algerian question, which remained on the agenda but was not debated publicly. This year, given the new composition of the General Assembly, it is possible that the question may be put on the agenda with a greater majority than in 1955. Not only will there be the 16 new members admitted at the end of the 1955 session, but three additional members—Morocco, Tunisia and the Sudan—have been admitted in November 1956. In the atmosphere of heightened emotionalism on both sides created by the Suez crisis, there seems little likelihood of avoiding a bitter General Assembly debate once the Algerian item gets on the agenda.

### Spotlight

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aggressor and appeared to defend Egypt, informed observers believe that the pressure of Moscow, rather than of Washington, caused London and Paris to accept a cease-fire and Israel to promise eventual withdrawal of its forces from Egypt.

### Three Alternatives

In this changed world context what alternatives are open to the United States if it is to continue competing with Russia? Three alternatives appear possible:

1. The United States could take the fateful decision of risking all-out war with Russia. Such a risk is in-

herent in the inflammable situation of both Eastern Europe and the Middle East. This country could take up arms either to liberate the Eastern European nations from Moscow's rule and/or influence, or to replace Britain and France as the dominant Western power in the Middle East, blocking further interventions by Russia—or both. The perils of a prospective nuclear war are obvious to both sides. But other perils, too, must be taken into account. Among them are the possibilities that Communist China, which has backed Russia on Hungary, might seize this opportunity to invade Formosa and open a third front; that Yugoslavia, which has hitherto tried to keep a balance between East and West, might choose, or be forced, to side with Russia; and that anti-Western Arab nationalism, further exacerbated by the Anglo-French action on Suez, might undermine American military efforts.

2. The United States could take the equally fateful decision, which has been weighed by some American students of Russo-American relations, of recognizing the security problems of the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe, which would exist even if it were ruled by non-Communists. This country could restudy its policy on Germany with a view to reassuring not only Moscow but also Poland that it would not acquiesce in any

German attempt to recover the Oder-Nisse territories by force, and give serious consideration to plans for some form of guarantee of Russia's own borders which have been intermittently but inconclusively discussed during the past few years. It could also acknowledge the need of the underdeveloped countries for economic aid from whatever quarter it may come—either through trade by other nations with Russia and Communist China, or through Russian technical contributions, or through financial and technical assistance from the West—and implement the bold suggestion of Governor Christian A. Herter of Massachusetts for Russo-American cooperation in this sphere instead of bitter-end competition.

3. The United States could take the broader step of agreeing to a new type of "summit" conference—a UN conference at which the over-all problems of all areas of the world now in a state of flux could be discussed—and discussed not only by the great powers, whose prestige has been weakened by recent events, but also by the small nations, which in a move that holds promise for the future have been invited to carry the burden of policing trouble spots under the sponsorship of the UN.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The first in a series of eight articles on "Decisions," 1957," a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

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